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Abstract - Ad hoc networks are highly dynamic routing networks cooperated by a collection of 
wireless mobile hosts without any assistance of a centralized access point. Secure Efficient Ad 
hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) is a proactive routing protocol, based on the design of Destination 
Sequenced Distance Vector routing protocol (DSDV). SEAD provides a robust protocol against 
attackers trying to create incorrect routing state in the other node. However, the computational 
cost creating and evaluating hash chain increases if number of hops in routing path increased. In 
this paper, we propose Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector with fixed hash chain length in 
short SEAD-FHC protocol to minimize and stabilize the computational complexity that leads 
minimization in delay time and maximization in throughput. A series of simulation experiments are 
conducted to evaluate the performance. 
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SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector 
Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
Prasuna V G α,  Dr. S. Madhusudhana Verma Ω
Abstract - Ad hoc networks are highly dynamic routing 
networks cooperated by a collection of wireless mobile hosts 
without any assistance of a centralized access point. Secure 
Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) is a proactive routing 
protocol, based on the design of Destination Sequenced 
Distance Vector routing protocol (DSDV). SEAD provides a 
robust protocol against attackers trying to create incorrect 
routing state in the other node. However, the computational 
cost creating and evaluating hash chain increases if number of 
hops in routing path increased. In this paper, we propose 
Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector with fixed hash chain 
length in short SEAD-FHC protocol to minimize and stabilize 
the computational complexity that leads minimization in delay 
time and maximization in throughput. A series of simulation 
experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance.
Keywords : Mobile ad hoc networks; Ad hoc network 
routing; Secure routing; SEAD; Hash chains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Author α : Assocaite Prof., Department Of MCA, Basaveswara Institute 
Of Information Technology, Hyderabad, AndhraPradesh, INDIA-
500027.                                                     
Author Ω : Professor & Head, Department of OR & SQC,                                      
Rayalaseema University, Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh, India – 518002.
Each style of ad hoc network routing protocol 
has advantages and disadvantages. In this paper, we 
focus on securing ad hoc network routing using periodic 
(or proactive) protocols, and in particular, using distance 
vector routing protocols. Distance vector routing 
protocols are easy to implement, require relatively little 
memory or CPU processing capacity compared to other 
types of routing protocols, and are widely used in 
networks of moderate size within the (wired) Internet 
[32,33,34]. A number of proposed periodic ad hoc 
network routing protocols are based on adapting the 
basic distance vector routing protocol design for use in 
mobile wireless ad hoc networks, including PRNET [26], 
DSDV [28], WRP [27], WIRP [25], and ADV [23]. 
Distance vector routing has also been used for routing 
within a zone in the ZRP hybrid ad hoc network routing 
protocol [31].
Ad-hoc network is a computer network in which 
the communication links are wireless and the devices on 
it communicate directly with each other. This allows all 
wireless devices within range of each other to discover 
and communicate in a peer-to-peer fashion without 
involving central access points.
An ad-hoc network tends to feature a small 
group of devices all in very close proximity to each 
other. Performance degrades as the number of devices 
grows, and a large ad-hoc network quickly becomes 
difficult to manage.
To design an Ad hoc network routing protocol is 
challenging, and to design a secure one is even more 
difficult. There are many research focus on how to 
provide efficient [35, 36] and secure [37, 38] 
communication in ad hoc networks.
The Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector 
(SEAD) [40] protocol uses one-way hash chains to 
prevent an attacker from forging better metrics or 
sequence numbers. But SEAD does not prevent an 
attacker from tampering other fields or from using the 
learned metric and sequence number to send new 
routing updates. In this paper, we proposed a new
ecure Ad Hoc network routing protocols are 
complex to design, due to the generally highly 
dynamic nature of an ad hoc network and due to 
the need to operate efficiently with limited resources, 
including network bandwidth and the CPU processing 
capacity, memory, and battery power (energy) of each 
individual node in the network. Existing insecure ad hoc 
network routing protocols are often highly optimized to 
spread new routing information quickly as conditions 
change, requiring more rapid and often more frequent 
routing protocol interaction between nodes than is 
typical in a traditional (e.g., wired and stationary) 
network. Expensive and cumbersome security 
mechanisms can delay or prevent such exchanges of 
routing information, leading to  reduced  routing 
S
effectiveness, and may consume excessive network or 
node resources, leading to many new opportunities for 
possible Denial-of-Service attacks through the routing 
protocol.
Routing protocols for ad hoc networks generally 
can be divided into two main categories: Periodic 
protocols and On-demand protocols. In a periodic (or 
proactive) routing protocol, nodes periodically exchange 
routing information with other nodes in an attempt to 
have each node always know a current route to all
destinations (e.g.,[22,23,24,25,26, 27,28]). In an on-
demand (or reactive) protocol, on the other hand, nodes 
exchange routing information only when needed, with a 
node attempting to discover a route to some destination 
only when it has a packet to send to that destination 
(e.g., [1,29,30]). In addition, some ad hoc network 
routing protocols are hybrids of periodic and on-
demand mechanisms (e.g., [31]).
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SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
protocol to improve security of SEAD. We also conduct 
some simulation experiments to evaluate the 
performance of our proposed protocol.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The problem with many routing protocols for ad 
hoc networks is that those protocols are vulnerable to 
security attacks. The attacks can be classified as 
passive or active attacks. In a passive attack, a 
malicious node ignores operational requirements of the 
network. For example, an intermediate node along a 
route does not forward a packet, or hides routing 
information. Multiple routes and redundant messaging 
can alleviate passive attacks.
In an active attack, the malicious node 
introduces false information, e.g., a false distance 
vector, a false destination sequence, or a false route 
request. This confuses routing procedures and 
degrades network performance. With a false route, the 
malicious node can intercept and comprise packets.
Misdirecting is another active attack. Here, an 
intermediate node forwards packets along incorrect 
paths. This attack affects the source node by directing 
packets away from the intended destination node.
The AODV protocol uses destination sequence 
numbers to indicate how recently the routing information 
was generated. When multiple routes are available, the 
source node always selects a route associated with a 
largest destination sequence number.
A malicious node can fabricate a false large 
destination sequence number to attract traffic. Even 
worse, a deceived node can propagate, in good faith, a 
false route to other nodes to exacerbate the impact of 
the attack. In this case, the attacker can maliciously 
attract and discard data traffic.
A malicious node can also consume a large 
amount of the network bandwidth by broadcasting 
fictitious destination addresses to which no node can 
reply. This delays other traffic and can cause packets to 
be dropped, lowering overall network performance.
III. RELATED WORK
There are known techniques for minimizing 
‘Byzantine’ failures caused by nodes that through malice 
or malfunction exhibit arbitrary behavior such as 
corrupting, forging, and delaying routing messages. A 
routing protocol is said to be Byzantine robust when it 
delivers any packet from a source node to a destination 
as long as there is at least one valid route [3]. However, 
the complexity of that protocol makes it unsuitable for 
ad hoc networks.
Papadimitrators et al [4] described a secure 
routing protocol (SRP) that prevents impersonation and 
replay attacks for on-demand routing. The protocol 
disables route caching and provides end-to-end 
authentication with an HMAC primitive [5]. However, that 
protocol cannot prevent vicious request flooding 
because there is no mechanism for authenticating 
source and intermediate nodes.
Dahill et al[6] introduced another technique 
uses hop-by-hop authentication. Every node is required 
to sign and authenticate every message. That increases 
processing requirements and the size of messages.
Zapata [7] introduced another technique 
requires that each node has access to a certified public 
key of all network nodes to validate all routing packets. 
The originator of a message appends an RSA signature, 
and a last element of a hash chain, i.e., a result of n 
consecutive hash calculations on a random number[8, 
9]. As the message traverses the network, intermediate 
nodes can validate cryptographically the signature and 
the hash value, generate a kth element of the hash chain, 
with k being the number of traversed hops, and add the 
hash chain to the message [10].
However, public-key cryptography imposes a 
high processing overhead on the nodes and may be 
unrealistic for practical low-cost, ad hoc networks of 
low-complexity devices, such as sensors. Hash chaining 
requires that the nodes have synchronized clocks[11]. 
However, that technique can only discover attacks long 
after they happened.
Hauser et al[12] avoid that defect by using hash 
chains to reveal the status of specific links in a link-state 
algorithm. Their method also requires synchronization of 
the nodes.
Hu[13] introduced another technique called 
SEAD that uses a node-unique hash chain that is 
divided into segments. The segments are used to 
authenticate hop counts. However, DSDV distributes 
routing information only periodically.
In many applications, reactive or on demand 
routing protocols are preferred. With on demand routing, 
source nodes request routes only as needed. On 
demand routing protocols performs better with 
significantly lower overhead than periodic routing 
protocols in many situations [13]. The authentication 
mechanism of Ariadne[13] is based on TESLA[15]. They 
use only efficient symmetric-key cryptographic 
primitives. The main drawback of that approach is the 
requirement of clock synchronization, which is very hard 
for wireless ad hoc networks.
Most secure routing protocols are based on 
authentication in the route discovery process. Some 
techniques detect faulty links based on observation of 
misbehavior during packet forwarding. 
Marti et al [16] described a protocol for 
detecting and avoiding routers that drop or modify 
packets in ad hoc networks running DSR protocol. They 
have trusted nodes monitoring neighboring nodes. That 
technique does not work well in multi-rate wireless 
networks because nodes might be able to intercept 
packets forwarded with different modulations schemes. 
In addition, that method is vulnerable to collusion and 
 misbehavior because there is no authentication.
 
Awerbuch et al[17] invention was based on 
adaptive probing
 
techniques. However, malicious nodes 
can differentiate probing packets from normal data 
packets, and therefore, can selectively forward the 
probing packets to avoid detection.
 
Herzberg et al[18] described a combination of 
acknowledgements, timeouts and fault announcements, 
to detect packet forwarding faults. This proposal 
empirically described by Avramopoulos et al[19]. 
However, that protocol requires a separate 
authentication password for each of the intermediate 
router, thus adding more communication overhead 
when multi-hops are used.
 
A secure dynamic routing (SDR)[20] protocol is 
entirely on demand, and uses two primary mechanisms, 
route discovery and route maintenance. When a source 
node has a packet to send to a destination node but 
does not have a route to that destination node, the 
source node broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet. 
The packet specifies the destination and a unique RREQ 
broadcast identifier. A receiving node attaches its own 
node address to a list in the RREQ and rebroadcast the 
RREQ. When the RREQ reaches the destination node, 
or any intermediate node that knows a route to the 
destination, that node sends a route reply (RREP) 
packet back to the source node, including an 
accumulated list of addresses from the source to the 
destination node. When the RREP reaches the source 
node, it stores the route in its route cache. Route 
maintenance is a mechanism for detecting changes in 
the topology of the network that can make a stored 
route invalid. This is done with a route error packet.
 
IV.
 
SEAD-FHC
 
a)
 
An algorithmic description of the SEAD-FHC
 
1.
 
A method authenticates packets that are transmitted 
serially in a network. 
 
2.
 
A current password  is selected for a current packet 
to be transmitted. 
 
3.
 
Includes current data . 
 
4.
 
A secure hash function 
 
is applied to the 
current password to form a current tag . 
 
5.
 
A password 
 
is selected for a packet that is 
in sequence and fallows , which includes data , 
and 
 
is applied to to form a tag .
 
6.
  
Is then applied to the ,
 
and 
 
to obtain 
a hashed value . 
 
7.
 
Is then transmitted that includes the , , , 
password 
 
of packet that sent  before  in 
sequence to authenticate .
 
b)
 
Algorithm to authenticate sequence transmission of 
the packets
 
Countersign will be selected for 
 
that 
includes to be transmitted.
 
=
 
Countersign will be selected for 
 
with 
data to be transmitted in sequence, 
 
=
 
Apply 
 
to the ,
 
and that creates 
authentication tag for 
 
referred as 
 
 
Transmit from a source node to a 
destination node through hops in path selected 
through optimal route selection strategy.
 
The currently transmitting packet contains 
 
and a countersign 
 
of packet 
 
that 
transmitted before 
 
to authenticate .
 
In the interest of route maintenance, every hop 
in rout contains a cache that maintains hop list 
describing the route selected using an optimal route 
selection model. We apply 
 
on cache of each hop of 
the route to verify the integrity of the hop list cached.
 
c)
 
Architecture of the proposed protocol
 
Proposed model provides an authentication 
protocol for a wireless ad hoc network where packets 
are transmitted serially. By serially, we mean a current 
packet 
 
is immediately preceded by a previous packet
, and followed immediately by a next packet .
 
More particularly, during a route discovery 
phase, we provide secure route selection, i.e., a shortest 
intact route, that is, a route without any faulty links. 
During route maintenance phase, while packets are 
forwarded, we also detect faulty links based on a time 
cp cd
( )hf cpw
ct
npw np
cp nd
( )hf npw nt
( )hf nd nt cpw
cH
cp cH cd ct
ppw pp cp
cd
( )cp
cs cp
cd
ct ( ) ( )( )ch pf cs
( )np
cs np
nd
nt ( ) ( )( )nh pf cs
( )hf nd nt ( )cpcs
np ( )npat
( ) ( ) ( )( , , )n cp h n n pat f d t cs= < >
cp sn
dn
( ) , ,np c cat d t ( )ppcs pp
cp cd
( )hf
cp
pp np
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SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
out condition. Receiving an acknowledgement control 
packet signals successful delivery of a packet.
For packet authentication, we use 
described by Benjamin Arazi et al [21]. The hash 
function encodes a countersign to form a tag.
By we mean that the countersign cannot be 
decoded from the tag and the countersign is used only 
( )hf
( )hf
once, because part of its value lies in its publication after 
its use. We have adapted that protocol for use in an ad 
hoc network where multiple packets need to be sent 
sequentially. Therefore, if a number of packets are sent 
sequentially, the countersign needs to be refreshed 
each time. Thus, a single authentication is associated 
with a stream of future packets that is significant 
difference between proposed and existing hash chain 
techniques. The existing models require stream of future 
events. In addition, the countersign is used to 
authenticate but not for future packets.cp
  
 
 
be known ahead of time or distributed among the nodes 
after the system becomes operational. It should also be 
noted, that each countersign is used only one time, 
because the countersign is published to perform the 
authentication.
 
The 
 
as implemented by the proposal is 
ideal for serially communicating packets along a route in 
an ad hoc network, without requiring the nodes to 
establish shared secret countersigns beforehand.
 
The protocol includes the following steps. 
Select a random countersign . Form a tag , =
, Construct a message Form a hash 
value
 
, and make it public. 
Perform the act and reveal 
 
to authenticate 
the act.
 
V.
 
SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
DISCUSSION
 
The experiments were conducted using NS 2. 
We build a simulation network with hops under mobility 
and count of 100 to 1400. The simulation parameters 
described in table 1.  We assume that each node has a 
memory buffer large enough to ensure that normal 
packets are never dropped because of congestion. 
Authentication ensures that the buffer is properly 
allocated to valid packets. Buffers also protect against 
traditional DoS, in which malicious nodes flood the 
network with unauthenticated packets. Malicious nodes 
that send packets frequently could otherwise quickly 
consume all allocated buffer space.
 
We authenticate route request (RREQ) by 
 
at source node and broadcast identifier in the route 
discovery phase, and data control packets in the packet 
forwarding phase. Thus, we prevent malicious requests 
and replay attacks. We also use a per-hop hashing to 
verify that no intermediate hop is omitted in a node list 
describing a route. A route reply (RREP) is authenticated 
by a destination node and therefore, attackers cannot 
cheat other nodes by fabricating routing information.
 
Table1 :
 
Simulation parameters that we considered for 
experiments
 
Number of nodes
 
100 to 1400
 
Maximum velocity
 
20 m/s
 
Dimensions of space
 
1500 X 300 m2
 
Nominal radio range
 
250 m
 
Source destination pairs
 
20
 
Source data rate (each)
 
4 packets/s
 
Application data payload 
size
 
512 bytes/packet
 
Total application data load
 
327 kbps
 
Raw physical link 
bandwidth
 
2 mbs
 
Periodic route update 
interval
 
15s
 
Periodic updates missed 
before link is declared 
broken
 
3
 
Maximum packets buffered 
per node per destination
 
5
 
Hash length
 
80 bits
 
 
Our authentication mechanism is different than 
existing secure routing protocols based on digital 
signature, because only efficient symmetric key 
cryptography is used. Our method is also better than 
existing hash chain based protocols, because a node 
stores only one countersign, while hash chain based 
protocols store multiple countersigns, which increases 
memory requirements.
 
To detect faulty links, we use 
acknowledgements, timeouts, and fault 
announcements; these can also be authenticated by our
. Therefore, we need only a single authentication tag 
for each data and control packet; thereby bandwidth 
and memory usage is low.
 
With faulty link detection, all passive and active 
attackers that fail to forward data packets and that 
maliciously misdirect data packets are recognized and 
avoided in subsequent routings.
 
a)
 
Protocol Description
 
i.
 
Secure Route Discovery
 
In on demand routing protocols, e.g., DSR, a 
source node initiates route discovery to find a route 
when the source node has a packet to send to a 
destination node, and the source node does not store a 
( )hf
rcs rt rt
( ) ( )h rf cs rmac
( ) ( , , )r h r r rH f mac t cs= < >
, ,r r rmac t cs
( )hf
( )hf
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SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
route to the destination node in its route cache. The 
source node does this by broadcasting a RREQ control 
packet to neighboring nodes. Neighboring nodes 
rebroadcast the request, until the request eventually 
finds its way to the destination node so that intermediate 
nodes on the route can be discovered. We authenticate 
the RREQ control packet with hash function .( )hf
ii. RREQ Authentication
,
The routing path between source node and 
destination node contains .. as 
sn
dn hn 1hn + h zn +
As an advantage over prior art asymmetric 
digital signature or secret countersigns do not need to 
   
  
 
The source node selects two random 
countersigns and , and broadcasts a first 
RREQ:
 
       
(1)
 
 
 
In Eq(1) is optimal digital signature 
function, is node address identity and is broadcast 
id. 
 
 
is a digital signature to 
verify 
 
by other nodes, so that every 
intermediate node and the destination can verify that the 
in the packet is valid and 
indeed generated by the claimed .
 
A hop node in the route path generates a route 
entry by storing the of , =1, , 
and . These values can 
verify future route requests from the same source node. 
The component 
 
uniquely identifies . 
The value is incremented whenever the source node 
issues a new .
 
The secret key is shared between , . 
This needs only be used for the first packet.
 
Because of the broadcast nature of the 
control packets, every node in the ad hoc network 
eventually receives the after a time ’ ’, 
where m is a diameter of the network, and Δ
 
is a 
maximum delay at intermediate hop.
 
After a time interval ‘ ’, the sends next 
route request . Therefore, the source node 
selects next random countersign , and broadcasts
:
 
 
           (2)
The intermediate node finds the route entry 
associated with the claimed source node, and performs
 
on that received in 
 
and checks the 
equality with 
 
that received in , which stored 
in the route entry. If is equal to 
 
then 
applies 
 
on 
 
that received 
through 
 
and checks if the result is the same 
as stored in the route
 
entry, if valid, the authenticity of 
 
is verified. Thus, 
 
is assured that 
is from the claimed source node and the 
present is valid. The then updates its routing entry 
by recording that received through , 
 
and , 
which are used to authenticate .
 
In general, before sending a route request
, the source node waits a time interval 
 
rcs 'rcs
( )
( ) ( )
1( ) 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) 1( ) ( ) 1 ( )
( ), ( ) 1
( ( ), ( )
( ), ( ) 2
{ , ( ), ), ( , ( ), ), ( ), ( , )}
s
s
s id s id s id
n ds s h r
s id s id s id
i s id h r n h s id h r r d id h s d
n n a n b
sig f n id f cs
n n a n b
RREQ n f cs sig f n f cs cs n a f n n
+ + +
+ +
=< = >
=
=< = >
=
( )dsf
ida idb
( ) ( )( ( ), ( ))ds s h rf n id f cs
( )( ( ), ( )s h rn id f cs
( )( , , ( ))id id h ra b f cs iRREQ
sn
ida sn idb ( ) ( )r h rhcs f cs=
2 ( ) 1 ( ) '( , ( ), )e h s h r rh f n f cs cs+=
,id ida b< > RREQ
idb
RREQ
( , )s dn n
k sn dn
RREQ
iRREQ m∆
m∆ sn
1iRREQ +
2rcs +
1iRREQ +
1
1( ) 1 1
( ) 1 ( ) 1
2( ) 2 2
1 1( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2 1 ( )
( ), ( ) 2
( ( ), ( ))
( ), ( ) 3
{ , ( ), ), ( , ( ), ), ( ), ( , )}
s
s id
        ds s h r
s id s id s id
i s id h r n h s id h r r d id h s d
n n a n b
cs          f n id f cs
n n a n b
RREQ n f cs sig f n f cs cs n a f n n
+
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ + + + + +
=< = >
=
=< = >
=
( )hf rcs 1iRREQ +
rhcs iRREQ
( ) ( )h rf cs rhcs hn
( )hf 1( ), ( ) 1( ( ), )s id h r rn f cs cs+ +
1iRREQ +
2eh
1 ( ) 1( , ( ))s h rn f cs+ + hn
1iRREQ +
idb hn
idb 1iRREQ +
( ) 1( )r h rhcs f cs += 2 2 ( ) 2 1( , ( ), )e s h r rh n f cs cs+ + +=
2iRREQ +
thk
kRREQ m∆
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SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
intermediate hops, where ‘z’ is count of the intermediate 
hops.
after sending the previous request . Then, the 
source node selects a new random countersign , 
and broadcasts :
As a part of process at , appends its own 
address to the intermediate node list in the , 
performs the per-hop hashing, which is achieved by 
calculating a new hash tag by hashing its own address 
1kRREQ −
1kcs +
kRREQ
hn
RREQ
concatenated with the old hash tag, and replacing the 
old hash tag,  then rebroadcasts the RREQ. If any check 
fails, the RREQ is dropped.
Thus, with per-hop hashing, an attacker cannot 
delete an intermediate node from the node list, because 
the attacker does not have the secret countersign 
between the intermediate node and the destination 
node.
 
r
  
 
When the 
 
reaches the’ ’, then 
verifies it by checking if 
 
If the check succeeds, 
then the integrity of this is verified, along with 
the authenticity of its origin and every intermediate node 
along the path from node to node .Then sends a 
back to the source node, including an 
authenticated copy of the accumulated list of addresses 
from the 
 
i.e., the packet data for the 
control packet.
 
 
The control packet contains
 
RREQ dn dn
( , )h dn n
k
RREQ
sn dn dn
RREP
RREQ RREQ
RREP
1
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( ) , ,.. ...
 
' '
  
int
 
, ( , ( ) , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ), ( , ), ( , )
h h h h z
id s h d h d h z h d h z h d h z h d h h d h h d s
n lst n n n where z representsnumber of ermediatehops
b n n lst n f n n f n n f n n f n n f n n f n n
+ +
+ + − + − +
=< >
< >
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Where is for the source to verify the 
freshness of the reply. .As the packet passes 
through intermediate nodes back to the source node, 
each node checks the corresponding authentication tag, 
and stores the route information in its route cache. The 
source node then selects a shortest route to the 
destination node without previously detected faulty links.
iii. Data transmission and malicious hop detection
Here in this section we describe the procedure 
of authentication data packets forwarded from the 
source node to the destination node, along the selected 
route, while checking for faulty links. In DSR, the source 
route information is carried in each packet header.
To send a packet that is a part of data to be 
sent to destination node , the source node picks 
two counter signs and fixes the time limit to 
receive either one of packet delivery acknowledgement 
or a control packet that acknowledges about 
malicious link in the route path. The source node sends 
idb sn
RREP
im
dn sn
1,r rcs cs +
ack ackmn
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1{ , ( ), ( , ( )), ( , ( ), )}i i h r d si h r h i h r rmsg m f cs f m f cs f m f cs cs+ +=
to the along the route. 
Here is a digital signature to 
verify by intermediate hops of the route 
selected, so that every ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ can verify that 
is valid and indeed generated by the 
claimed .
Then each hop updates route table entry for 
source node S by recording as ,
as , which is used to 
authenticate an immediate fallowing message in 
sequence.
When sending the data packet , the 
selects another countersign and forwards the 
to the first hop of the selected path: 
hn
( ) ( )( , ( ))ds i h rf m f cs
( )( , ( )i h rm f cs
hn dn
( )( , ( ))i h rm f cs
sn
( ) ( )h rf cs ( )r shcs n
( ) 1 ( ) 1( , ( ), )h i h r rf m f cs cs+ + 2 ( )e sh n
1imsg +
1im + sn
2rcs +
1imsg +
1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 1{ , ( ), , ( , ( ), )}i i h r r h i h r rmsg m f cs cs f m f cs cs+ + + + + +=
Each node on the route calculates 
and compares with that available in routing 
( ) ( )h rf cs
( )r shcs n
table, if results equal then will be authenticated as 
valid. The then calculates , 
rcs
hn ( ) 1 ( ) 1( , ( ), )h i h r rf m f cs cs+ +
and compares with result is equivalent then 2 ( )e nh s
claims the validity of . The node then 1 ( ) 1( , ( ))i h rm f cs+ +
During the packet sending process described 
earlier, if any of the checks fails, then the packet is 
dropped. If both checks succeed, then the node 
updates its routing entry associated with . If the check 
at , then either or in 
has been modified, or node modified 
in . In either case, the 
current hop node drops the packet. Consequently, 
hop node does not receive a valid after time 
out, and the node can report a malicious activity at
connection, or the hop node reports 
about malicious activity between to . In 
either case, the fault link includes the malicious node
.
sn
hn 1hn − ( ) 1 ( ) 1( , ( ), )h i h r rf m f cs cs+ +
imsg 1hn −
( ) 1 ( ) 1( , ( ), )h i h r rf m f cs cs+ + 1imsg +
hn
1hn − ack
1( , )h hn n− 2hn −
2 1( , )h hn n− − sn
1hn −
In our proposed model the authentication tag of 
each packet limited to two hashes and one countersign; 
while in the existing models required N authentication 
tags for a route with N hops. Therefore, our method has 
a lower communication and storage overhead.
message with the format
updates its routing entry by recording
and , 
and forwards the data packet to the node along the 
route as specified in the header of the packet header.
1 ( ) 1( )r h rhrc f rc+ +=
( 2) ( ) ( 2) ( ) 2 1( ) ( , ( ), )e s h i h r rh n f m f cs r+ + += and    
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
The packet authentication process at is 
identical to the authentication process at any 
intermediate hop . If any of the checks fails, then the 
packet is dropped. If both checks succeed, the packet 
is delivered successfully, and schedules the ‘ ’ for 
transmission along the reverse of path of the route. The 
 
reflects the packet identification number .
 
The destination node also appends an 
authentication tag to the message for the nodes on 
the reverse path. The authentication tag bears the same 
structure as the one generated by the source node. 
Specifically, when sending , for the packet ‘ ’, the 
destination node randomly selects two countersigns 
and , and sends the following information: 
 
. 
 
 
dn
hn
ack
ack i
ack
iack im
recs 1recs +
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1, ( ), ( , ( )), ( , ( ), )i h re ds i h i h i h re reack f cs f ack f ack f ack f cs cs+ +
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Similarly, is used to 
verify by each node along the reverse 
path of the route. When sending the acknowledgement 
for packet ‘ ‘, the destination selects a new 
countersign and forwards:
.
If the timeout at an intermediate node expires, 
then that node sends with an identification 
number according to our hash function for 
authentication of the by the upstream nodes. 
When a node receives the , the node verifies its 
authenticity and that a timeout is pending for the 
corresponding data packet. If the ‘ ’is not authentic 
or a timeout is not pending, the node discards the . 
Otherwise; the node cancels the timeout and forwards 
the ‘ to the next node.
When a node receives , it verifies its 
authenticity, and that a timeout is pending for the 
corresponding data packet, and that the link reported in 
the is the first downstream to the node that 
generated . If the is not authentic, or a 
timeout is not pending, or the link is not the downstream 
to the node reporting ‘ ’, then the node drops 
. Otherwise, the node cancels the timeout and 
further forwards the control packet. Upon 
receiving ‘ ’, the source node deletes the link that 
connecting referred in and finds a new route. In 
( ) ( )( , ( ))ds i h ref ack f cs
( )( , ( ))i h reack f cs
im
1recs +
1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 1( , ( ), , ( ( ), ))i h re re h i h re reack f cs cs f ack f cs cs+ + + + +
ackmn
ackmn
ack
ack
ack
ack
ackmn
ackmn
ackmn ackmn
ackmn
ackmn
ackmn
ackmn
hn ackmn
this proposed model, the packets are always received 
as in the order they sent. This is because all packets are 
forwarded along the same route in DSR. In the case of 
congestion and buffering, the messages are stored in a 
first-in-first-out buffer according to the order that they 
are received.
When the source node wants to use another 
path to the destination node, the source node selects a 
new countersign and authenticates the countersign with 
every node along the new route, and reinitiates the entire 
process, as described above.
b) Results Discussion
Here we describe the scalability of SEAD-FHC 
over SEAD in terms of control packet that costs 
resource utilization.  We can observe that SEAD-FHC is 
almost similar to SEAD when node count is fewer. But 
we can observe that SEAD-FHC improving the 
minimization of the control packets when node count 
increased. It is obvious since the SEAD-FHC stabilizing 
the delay time even at maximum node count, which 
helps in minimizing packet drops due to delay and 
improves throughput. This results as fewer control 
packet utilization.
Here we describe the scalability of SEAD-FHC 
over SEAD in terms of packet delivery ratio. Since Hash 
chain computation cost is drastically minimized in 
SEAD-FHC, the delay time minimized and throughput 
increased.
Here we describe the performance of SEAD-
FHC over SEAD in terms of Hash chain evaluation cost.  
Let be the cost threshold to evaluate each hash in 
hash chain. We measure the Hash chain evaluation cost 
as
λ
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, here z is number of nodes and n is 
number of hashes, as of the chaining concept of SEAD 
z=n but in SEAD-FHC n always 2
 
 
1 1
z n
i j
z
λ
= =
∑∑
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VI. CONCLUSION
Here in this paper we proposed a secure 
efficient distance vector routing with fixed hash chain 
length in short we referred as SEAD-FHC. We argued 
that fixed hash chain limits the computation cost and 
resource utilization. We empirically demonstrated that 
SEAD-FHC is scalable and performs well over SEAD. In 
future experiments can target to extend this protocol to 
support path restoration mechanism. Here SEAD-FHC 
relies on new route detection upon link failure.
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